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Abstract
The toleration of religious minorities is changing in the Netherlands. In this paper we 
analyze three recent developments in Dutch society that are important for under-
standing the way the Dutch regime of religious tolerance is adjusting to 21st century 
circumstances. The first one concerns the growing homogenization of Dutch society 
and the emergence of a secular and liberal majority. The second is the dominance in 
policy and public debate of a “Protestant” conception of what religion amounts to. The 
third development is the fragmentation of religion and its simultaneous combination 
into new networks and groups made possible by new information and communication 
technologies. These developments pose challenges to constitutional rights and prin-
ciples. There are no simple solutions to these challenges, but the Dutch tradition of 
consociationalism, as a liberal tradition in its own right, may provide some valuable 
perspectives.
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1 Introduction1
Regimes and practices for the toleration and accommodation of religious 
 diversity cannot be designed in a vacuum. They depend on social context and 
on the patterns of religious diversity in the community that is doing the toler-
ating.2 It matters whether religious groups are geographically concentrated or 
thinly spread over the population. It matters whether religious communities 
are historically entrenched, with established rights, or whether they are loose 
collections of recent arrivals, immigrants who chose to move to a host polity 
freely and individually. Size also matters. Is there a large majority tolerating 
several small minorities, or is there a set of coequal religious and secular com-
munities tolerating each other? The nature of religions practiced by groups of 
citizens matters, too. Do religious communities possess a highly organized 
church structure, or do they constitute a fuzzy group of believers? Is there a set 
of well-understood rules and precepts guarded by priests and church leaders, 
or are believers bound together mainly by shared rituals and what Alexis de 
Tocqueville, in a political context, once termed “habits of the heart.”3 All these 
things bear on the possible normative solutions for religious diversity within a 
liberal democratic order.4
Historically, in the Netherlands, the dominant regime of toleration has been 
verzuiling, or “consociationalism.”5 It is a system of accommodation of  religious 
1 Earlier drafts of this paper were presented at the conference: The Future of the Religious Past 
in Amsterdam, 2011, the Law and Society Association Annual Meeting in Minneapolis, 2014, 
and the International Association for the Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy (ivr) in 
Lisbon, 2017. We want to thank Stefan Philipsen and Sohail Wahedi for comments on a draft 
version of this paper, and our student assistants Jacqueline Brand and Haris Sabanovic for 
their help with the literature research and the final editing. The research for this paper was 
partly financed by the Dutch Research Council (nwo).
2 We agree with Michael Walzer, On Toleration (New Haven: Yale University press, 1997, 3) that 
regimes of toleration need to be differentiated by time and place and that they need to be 
“properly circumstantial.”
3 “Habits of the heart” is a phrase popularized by Robert Bellah et al., Habits of the Heart (1985). 
The phrase originates in George Lawrence’s translation of Alexis de Tocqueville’s Democracy 
in America (1966).
4 This article is written in the vein of pragmatism. It proceeds from the notion that normative 
and descriptive theory are continuous. For us, normative theory is inescapably situated and 
needs to be informed by a rich and detailed understanding of real-world practices. Our aim 
is not to devise a theory from first principles, or to develop a theoretical edifice behind a veil 
of ignorance, but to argue from real-world circumstances toward what John Dewey called 
“ends in view,” i.e., ends that are informed by situation we find ourselves in, and that can be 
feasibly attained from these situations.
5 “Verzuiling,” literally means “pillarization,” i.e., a vertical segmentation of society.
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division that resulted from a long history of sizable, geographically concen-
trated religious minorities cohabitating in a single nation state without any 
one group ever constituting a majority. The system of consociationalism, 
which operated until the 1960s, is a model the Netherlands shared with a small 
number of other countries.6 Under consociationalism, the Dutch state did not 
deal with religious division by a hands-off approach, but by sharing power and 
giving every secular and religious group its due, i.e., a proportional share in the 
public good. For example, religious and secular groups managed their own 
public schools and broadcast their own public television and radio programs, 
in proportion to their size. Today, as a result of secularization, this traditional 
arrangement is rapidly disappearing. The Netherlands is no longer the patch-
work quilt of secular and religious groups that it once was, but increasingly 
resembles a monochromatic secular cloth with a small number of religious 
embroideries—some old and familiar, like the remaining Protestant commu-
nity, others new and exotic, like the various communities of Muslims or Polish 
Catholics. The new dominance of a secular majority has clearly changed the 
context of toleration in Dutch society. If in the past different religious and sec-
ular groups were forced to share power, today a secular majority can, if it so 
desires, set the terms for the way in which religious groups are tolerated. This 
has made a marked difference in the way religious diversity is currently 
accommodated.
In this paper, we analyze three developments in modern Dutch society that 
are important for understanding the changes, and discuss the challenges they 
pose to the legal system and the liberal political culture of the Netherlands. 
The first of these developments is the recent secular homogenization of Dutch 
society. According to sociologist Jan Willem Duyvendak and historian James 
Kennedy, the Netherlands is no longer a country consisting of several sizable 
secular and religious minorities, like in the days of verzuiling, but a country 
with one large liberal majority.7 The second development is the growth of 
a certain insensitivity with respect to religion in a social context from which 
 religion is increasingly absent. A majority of Dutch citizens deal with reli-
gion  only obliquely and sporadically, therefore they no longer have regular 
6 Forms of consociational government also operated in Belgium, Austria, Switzerland, and 
Lebanon.
7 Jan Willem Duyvendak & Menno Hurenkamp, Kiezen voor de kudde. Lichte gemeenschappen 
en de nieuwe meerderheid (2004); Jan Willem Duyvendak, De staat en de straat. Beleid, weten-
schap en de multiculturele samenleving (2006); James C. Kennedy, Bezielende verbanden. Ge-
dachten over religie, politiek en maatschappij in het moderne Nederland (2009); Jan Willem 
Duyvendak, The Politics of Home. Belonging and Nostalgia in Western Europe and the United 
States (2011), especially Chapter 5.
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 exchanges with religion, and have a much more superficial understanding of it 
than did earlier generations. Lack of acquaintance with religion is leading to a 
reduction to the local, historically dominant Protestant conception of religion, 
that is, to an understanding of religion as a practice principally centered on a 
holy text and defined by it. This is a development that does not foster under-
standing of aspects of religion that do not fit this text-oriented conception. The 
third development is the process of hybridization and fragmentation of identi-
ties that the Netherlands is experiencing in an increasingly global and inter-
connected world, and the emergence of new networked religious communi-
ties.8 Although the Netherlands, much like other Western European countries, 
can be said to have gone through a process of secularization in recent decades, 
the world as a whole seems to be on an opposite course, having gone through 
a period of religious revival during the same time.9 The most visible aspect of 
this is the presence of a large Muslim minority in the Netherlands.
The central question is what are the implications of the three facets of con-
temporary Dutch society for political and legal practices in the Netherlands. To 
chart these implications, in Section 2, we provide some more details about the 
recent changes in the multireligious Dutch society. This also gives us an oppor-
tunity to take on two fundamental counter-arguments against our accommo-
dationist suggestions: first, that consociationalism is a model from the past 
that has outlived its relevance; and, second, that Islam, at least in its current 
shape, is simply irreconcilable with liberal democracy. In Section 3, we elabo-
rate on the dominant new secular liberal majority consensus described by 
Kennedy and Duyvendak. Our thesis is that, although there is a large unanim-
ity of opinion on secularism, when it comes to specific religious and cultural 
issues, this ideology is not monolithic, but it consists of a range of views on the 
role of religion in the public sphere. It is a consensus that combines classic 
liberal ideas on freedom of religion and separation of church and state, with 
notions taken from the French tradition of laïcité, and the widespread embrace 
of the permissive and progressive values of the 1960s counterculture. We argue 
that these different sources of the Dutch secular consensus pull in different 
directions and do not offer a clear-cut alternative to consociationalism.
In Section 4, we describe how the local Protestant model of what religion is 
has become dominant. This particular understanding of what religion is fails 
8 Duyvendak & Hurenkamp, supra note 7; Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid 
(wrr), Identificatie met Nederland (2007).
9 Peter L. Berger, The Desecularization of the World: Resurgent Religion and World Politics (1999); 
Hans Joas & Klaus Wiegandt, Säkularisierung und die Weltreligionen (2007); John Mickle-
thwait & Adrian Wooldridge, God is Back: How the Global Rise of Faith is Changing the World 
(2009).
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to recognize the importance of certain religious practices central to non- 
Protestant and non-Christian faiths. Finally, in Section 5, we describe the 
 processes of fragmentation and hybridization that add complexity to the situ-
ation. Globalization and networked communication create a social world that 
is both strongly compartmentalized, with likeminded people congregating 
within their own bubble, and strongly transnational, with national borders 
and geographic distance becoming less important. These processes have cre-
ated a highly diverse religious landscape and have brought forms of orthodoxy 
and fundamentalism to the Netherlands, which many Dutch citizens find 
problematic.
Sections 2 through 5 provide an outline of the new Dutch landscape of reli-
gious diversity and the way it is being accommodated. In the final part of the 
article, we explore some problems presented by this new lay of the land, this 
new configuration of the Netherlands as a country with a dominant secular 
majority and a set of small religious minorities. In Sections 6 and 7 we argue 
that these characteristics present serious challenges to current constitutional 
principles and rights. Finally, we argue that we need not regard these chal-
lenges as insurmountable. We draw on aspects of the tradition of consocia-
tionalism to sketch an alternative approach to the classic liberal, the secular 
republican, and the progressive nationalist strands in the current debate on 
religion in the Netherlands.
2 Social Change and the New Dutch Religious Landscape
As noted, recent developments that changed the Dutch religious landscape 
were, on one hand, the secularization of Dutch society, the fading of tradition-
al Dutch religious communities, and the dwindling of their system of consocia-
tionalism; and, on the other, the immigration and rise of new religious 
 communities, mainly Muslim, in a context of globalization and 21st century 
networked communication. Not everybody is familiar with the Dutch tradition 
of consociationalism, or with the current makeup of the main religious groups 
in the Netherlands. Hence, in this section we provide some details.
2.1 Consociationalism
The Netherlands is a product of the Reformation. It came into existence as a 
result of a Protestant rebellion against the rule of the Catholic king of Habsburg 
Spain. The Dutch republic was a country founded on the idea of religious free-
dom, although initially this did not include much tolerance of the Catholic 
minority. Throughout most of its history, the Netherlands has been a country 
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divided into several rival, partly geographically concentrated communities, or 
“pillars,” none of them dominant. Until the 1960s, these communities lived par-
allel lives. They had their own political parties, labor unions, newspapers, 
schools, and public broadcast organizations. Since the late 19th and early 20th 
century, these communities were not all religious. Alongside a Protestant and 
a Catholic pillars, there were also a liberal and a socialist one.
The political culture that developed to accommodate this type of deep 
 division was based on several characteristic principles. One of these was pro-
portionality, the idea that public services and public offices were divided 
 proportionally between the different groups in society. It was an approach in-
tended to give every group its due. Hence, the amount of broadcasting time on 
public television that you could fill; the number of mayors, who in the Nether-
lands are appointed rather than elected, that you could supply; and the num-
ber of public schools that you could operate roughly reflected the size of the 
group that shared your religion or your worldview. A second principle was the 
value of consensus. Dutch democratic decision-making is not centered on 
the idea of “winner takes all.” Dutch politics is consensual. It does not prize 
simple majority decisions in which you can maximize what you can get out of 
a decision for your own group, but seeks broad support from as wide a set of 
groups as possible. To this day, the clichés of Dutch politics reflect this value. 
When they are negotiating compromises, politicians often talk about “taking 
everybody along” (iedereen meenemen) or “creating a broad surface of support 
for a decision” (draagvlak creëren). Holland is known for its grass-roots consul-
tations and patient stakeholder deliberation. It is a political culture focused on 
appeasing political differences through compromise, rather than fighting out 
rivalries to push through your own proposal.
Consociationalism in the Netherlands is currently associated with the old-
fashioned politics of the past. It was originally conceived to address a set of 
circumstances that no longer exist, that is, the deep segmentation of society 
along religious and ideological lines. With secularization have come calls to 
adopt classic liberal or French republican models to protect freedom of reli-
gion through strict neutrality and a conception according to which religious 
freedom is guaranteed to individuals in the private sphere. Nevertheless, we 
believe that consociationalism still contains some valuable elements to build 
on. Its basic principles of inclusiveness, proportionality, and accommodation 
may still suggest solutions for dealing with the smaller religious minorities of 
the 21st century. Religious groups become entrenched and inward-looking as a 
result of networked communication technologies rather than geography, these 
days. We argue that it would be better to engage with these groups and accom-
modate and integrate them in the public sphere, than to ban their presence in 
 7Social Change and the Accommodation | 10.1163/22124810-2019004
<UN>
journal of law, religion and state (2020) 1-33
public. Indeed, in a recent book former vice-president of the Dutch Council of 
State argued that Dutch politics has become too managerial and distant, and 
that Dutch citizens have become too disengaged from the public weal. He sug-
gests drawing on the consociational politics of the past, with its dedication to 
“sovereignty within your own circle” and “subsidiarity,” to revive citizenship, 
empower citizens, and reconnect them with the Dutch state.10
2.2 New Religious Diversity and Islam in the Netherlands
The fading of consociationalism in the Netherlands is closely related to the 
process of secularization. Like many Northern European countries, the Neth-
erlands went through a rapid process of secularization in the second part of 
the 20th century. With religion playing an increasingly modest role in people’s 
lives, and churches and religious institutions disappearing, the consociational 
arrangements slowly became redundant. Since the 1960s and 1970s, there 
seemed to be no longer the entrenched religious and ideological divisions that 
the consociational system was designed to bridge. Yet, Dutch society never be-
came a fully secularized one. Remnants of the old religious communities 
 remained, and new ones were added through immigration. Beside a large mul-
tireligious community from Surinam and the Dutch Caribbean islands, it was 
mainly an influx of Muslims from Turkey and Morocco that added to the reli-
gious diversity of the Netherlands. These new religious groups did not conform 
to the secularization trend in the Netherlands. Their religiosity remains fairly 
high, and they seem able to sustain themselves in part because of improved 
information and communication technology.
This suggests that in open and interconnected societies like the Nether-
lands, religion will remain a persistent phenomenon, and that we are not likely 
to simply outlive religion. Moreover, it suggests that there can be no certainty 
that the future will be fully secular, and that the process of modernization has 
put a liberal democracy like the Netherlands on an automatic path to a world 
without religion.11 A study from 2018 found that on the whole, Muslims in the 
Netherlands were becoming more religious, praying more often, and visiting 
10 Herman Tjeenk Willink, Groter denken, kleiner doen: Een oproep (Amsterdam: Pro-
metheus, 2018), 64–65.
11 We take this to be the central notion of Jürgen Habermas’ post-secularism thesis. The 
secularization thesis notwithstanding, religion will not be fading away anytime soon, and 
post-secular societies must learn to embrace and incorporate the contributions of their 
religious communities (Jürgen Habermas, “Notes on Post-Secular Society”, 19 New Per-
spective Quarterly (2008)).
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the Mosque more regularly.12 Religion cannot be marginalized or discarded on 
the basis of some theory about the disenchantment of the world in late moder-
nity or the inevitability of secularization.
If this is true, from a liberal perspective, religions will have to be accommo-
dated as coequal ideas of the good, in the sense that John Rawls defends in his 
later work, Political Liberalism.13 For Rawls, a liberal order should not be seen 
as an expression of a distinct comprehensive liberal view of the good, but as a 
limited overlapping consensus of all the diverse secular and religious groups 
that make up the liberal order, that is, as a consensus on the way secular and 
religious groups should live together in the same political system. This is an 
“overlapping” consensus because it is constituted out of political principles 
and norms of civility that are part of each of the separate religious and secular 
views of the good that cohabitate the liberal order or can be adopted into it.14 
For example, there is not only a liberal argument for respecting fellow citizens 
with different views of the good, but also a Christian, Muslim, and Jewish argu-
ment for respecting them. (We believe that the Dutch system of consociation-
alism, the shared dedication to power sharing and proportionality was also an 
example of such an overlapping consensus, albeit not a Rawlsian liberal one.)15
The question that remains is whether religious groups, most notably Islam, 
can be seen as part of such an overlapping consensus. The suspicion that it 
cannot has made the accommodation of religion a controversial issue in  recent 
years. There has been a notable increase in anti-Muslim sentiment because 
12 Willem Huijnk, De religieuze beleving van Moslims in Nederland: Diversiteit en verandering 
in beeld (2018).
13 John Rawls, Political Liberalism (1993).
14 Clearly, liberal democracy is not exclusively a secular conception and achievement. We 
should recall that some of the great strides made in the 20th century with respect to 
equality and civil rights were brought about by leaders with strong religious motivations 
like Martin Luther King, a Baptist preacher, or Mahatma Gandhi, a Hindu leader. That is 
not to say that current aspirations in many liberal democracies to create a world with 
greater gender and sexual equality—perhaps the great social issues of our age—do not 
pose serious challenges to many religious communities.
15 Critics of Islam who argue that Islam is irreconcilable with liberal democracy would ar-
gue that Muslims are not and cannot be part of such an overlapping consensus on first 
principles. This position, i.e., that there is no such thing as a moderate Islam, mimics the 
dogmatism of Islamic fundamentalism in a secular frame. Even an outspoken critic of 
Islamic fundamentalism, like Ruud Koopmans, believes that we should be careful to dis-
tinguish Islamism from Islam (2019). Other religions also have fundamentalist off-shoots, 
he argues, and Islam accommodates a wide range of interpretations that can be recon-
ciled with liberal democracy. If there is no question that Muslim citizens can play a con-
structive role in a liberal polity, the next question is how best to facilitate that role? Koop-
mans’ focus is on confining and restricting fundamentalist Islam and treating Muslims 
with a healthy suspicion. Our focus is on making mainstream Islam part of the Dutch in-
stitutional landscape and giving it a stake in Dutch society.
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Islam is widely seen as a religion fundamentally at odds with the achievements 
of modernity. As a result, tolerance for traditional religious views and practices 
seems to have diminished. This changing attitude toward Islam is in part a re-
sponse to the large-scale influx of Muslims, and in part a response to the rise of 
Islamist religious extremism in recent decades, especially in the period follow-
ing 9/11. Although most Dutch citizens do not share the belief, propounded by 
some parties and commentators, that terrorism is inherent in Islam, their trust 
in their fellow Muslim citizens is clearly being tested by the rise of fundamen-
talist strains of Islam that seem difficult to square with liberal democracy and 
the fundamental rights of non-Muslims.16 Our analysis proceeds from the no-
tion that these fundamentalist strains are not representative of Islam, that 
there is nothing inherent in Islam that need prejudice it against liberal democ-
racy, and that Islam can be accommodated in Dutch society.17 The change in 
Dutch attitudes toward Muslims should also not be exaggerated. Although 
populist politicians like Pim Fortuyn, Geert Wilders, and most recently Thierry 
Baudet attract a great deal of media attention, the appeal of their brand of 
anti-Islamic populism seems to be limited to a maximum of about one fifth of 
the population.18 Large groups of Dutch citizens still favor openness and toler-
ance.19 The focus in the media is often on eye-catching extremes, while the 
complexities and unobtrusive continuities are ignored. There is more than just 
anecdotal evidence that in recent years Dutch attitudes toward religious mi-
norities in general, and Muslims in particular, have shifted and have become 
more negative.20
16 The most outspoken party in this regard is the pvv, which wants to forbid the Quran in 
the Netherlands, close Mosques and Islamic schools, and de-Islamicize the Netherlands 
(see its election program: Concept-verkiezingsprogramma pvv 2017–2021. viewed on 7 April 
2020 https://www.pvv.nl/visie.html).
17 A fierce critic of Islam like the Dutch sociologist Ruud Koopmans also stresses that there 
are many tolerant and peaceful interpretations of Islam (Het vervallen huis van de islam: 
Over de crisis van de islamitische wereld (2019), 7).
18 In 2009, the pvv achieved its best election results, with 17% of the popular vote. In 2017, it 
received 13%. In the provincial elections of 2019, the pvv and Baudet’s Forum voor 
Democratie party together gained about 20% of the vote and 18 out of 75 seats in the 
Dutch Senate.
19 The most recent survey by the Netherlands Institute for Social Research paints a mixed 
picture of Dutch attitudes toward discrimination. On one hand, Dutch people experience 
discrimination as a real and increasing problem, and on the other they increasingly be-
lieve that minorities are too sensitive and too quick to take offence. Moreover, both Islam-
ization and racism are mentioned as some the most salient concerns of today; Josje den 
Ridder et al., Burgerperspectieven (2017).
20 As of 2015, a majority of more than 50% of Dutch people described themselves as non-
religious (Hans Schmeets, De religieuze kaart van Nederland, 2010–2015 (2016), 5). About 
50% of Dutch people believe religion is a private matter that should not play a role in the 
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3 Reconstructing the Secular Majority Consensus
As noted above, Duyvendak has argued that since the 1960s, ideological and 
religious divisions started to abate, and the Netherlands became a relatively 
homogeneous country, with a broad secular consensus that coalesced around 
several socially liberal views, like the equality of men and women and the 
 acceptance of homosexuality and same-sex marriage.21 Naturally, the old com-
munities did not fully disappear. It would be misleading to speak of a fully ho-
mogeneous national culture. Rather, the Netherlands became a country with 
what could be called a “moral majority,” with a dominant, socially liberal ideol-
ogy or identity. Since the 1960s, the Netherlands developed an image of itself as 
a gidsland, a “guiding nation,” blazing the trail for other Western societies to 
follow, and pioneering several liberal and progressive arrangements, such as 
same-sex marriage, a liberal drug policy, and euthanasia. According to Duyven-
dak, the consensus around these values has become even more clear in the 21st 
century, in response to the arrival of Muslim immigrants. To define themselves 
against the traditionalism of Muslim citizens, a large majority ended up whole-
heartedly embracing socially liberal values that were still contentious well into 
the 1990s, like support of same-sex marriage and acceptance of lgbtq+ iden-
tity.22 When Duyvendak reconstructed these liberal views as a new source of 
Dutch identity, he made a valid point. Dutch citizens increasingly turn out to 
share a set of liberal-progressive preferences. In the Netherlands, these socially 
liberal views do not stand opposed to some notion of traditional Dutch iden-
tity, but rather make up this identity. Therefore, embracing same-sex marriage 
and supporting euthanasia are seen as quintessentially Dutch, not as devia-
tions from conventional Dutch values and beliefs. To be Dutch is to be socially 
liberal. Conversely, to hold on to socially traditional values is to be un-Dutch.
Duyvendak and Kennedy’s analysis of the rise of a socially liberal majority 
consensus is central to understanding the way religious minorities are pres-
ently accommodated in the Netherlands. Below we add nuance to the unity 
public sphere (Paul Dekker et al., Burgerperspectieven (2016), 51). Moreover, around half of 
non-immigrant Dutch people believe that Islam and the Western way of life are incom-
patible, and only around 40% feel that Muslims have a lot to contribute to Dutch culture 
(Claire Aussems, Moslims in Nederland 2014 (2016), 12).
21 Duyvendak & Hurenkamp, supra note 7; Duyvendak, De staat en de straat, supra note 7; 
Duyvendak, The Politics of Home, supra note 7. For a similar view, see Bas van Stokkom, 
Mondig tegen elke prijs. Het vrije woord als fetisj (2008).
22 Jan Willem Duyvendak, “Zijn we niet altijd al modern geweest?”, 73 Socialisme & Democra-
tie (2016), 13, 14–17. See also Lisette Kuiper, Opvattingen over seksuele en genderdiversiteit 
in Nederland en Europa (2018).
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and coherence of this liberal-progressive consensus, but first we need to sketch 
its rough outlines. Politically and legally, this consensus draws on three main 
sources. First, it contains several classically liberal elements like the separation 
of church and state and the freedom of religion. Second, it includes elements 
based on the French-republican tradition and the notion of laïcité, like the 
privatization of religion and the insistence on a strictly secular public sphere. 
The French republican conception of religious tolerance is not traditionally 
part of the Dutch tradition of tolerance and accommodation, but it has be-
come a fixture in the commentary of several prominent Dutch opinion leaders, 
like Ayaan Hirsi Ali, Paul Cliteur, and Paul Scheffer. Third, it draws on the pro-
gressivism and permissiveness of the 1960s, reconstructing these socially lib-
eral attitudes, like the voluntarism of lifestyle choices and the cultural and 
sexual liberation of the individual, as hallmarks of Dutch cultural identity.23 
Although these notions ostensibly promote freedom and choice, for people of 
faith they can be experienced as antagonistic and oppressive, because their 
religious beliefs are treated as old superstitions that need to be transcended, as 
narrowmindedness that needs to be opened up. Especially in the field of cul-
tural and religious differences, liberal progressivism and French-republican 
tendencies seem strong. If you believe that Dutchness, today, is centrally de-
fined by its rejection of traditional, religious beliefs, this conception evidently 
contains a built-in bias against people who hold such traditional religious 
beliefs.
The contemporary Dutch liberal majority consensus is characterized by 
a loose set of attributes that roughly represent the manner in which many 
citizens and politicians see themselves, and what they expect from religious 
 minorities. It is generally consistent with the changing conception of Dutch 
citizenship in integration policy discourse since the 1980s. Sociologists Wil-
lem Schinkel and Friso van Houdt described it as a change “from pluralist 
to universalist to assimilationist policy discourse; from thin to thick integra-
tion and identification; from state responsibility to individual and market-
based responsibility.”24 Whether one regards it as a new consensus among 
Dutch citizens, as Duyvendak and Kennedy do, or as a new mentality within 
policy discourse, as Schinkel and Van Houdt do, it has several recognizable 
characteristics.
23 Samira van Bohemen et al., “Seculiere intolerantie: Morele progressiviteit en afwijzing 
van de islam in Nederland”, 8 Sociologie (2012), 199.
24 Willem Schinkel and Friso van Houdt, “The double helix of cultural assimilationism and 
neo-liberalism: citizenship in contemporary governmentality”, The British Journal of Soci-
ology (2010), 701.
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1. A strong emphasis on liberty in the private sphere. In the private sphere, 
everyone should be free to do what they want, not only with regard to 
religion, but also with regard to sex and lifestyle, within the limits of the 
harm principle. In other words, liberty should be protected, as long as 
one does not harm others.
2. A voluntaristic understanding of identities. When it comes to religion, 
there is a strong emphasis on free choice. You can be what you choose to 
be. Religion, relationships, sexual preferences, culture, language, having 
children—are all considered to be the object of free choice; as Schinkel 
and Van Houdt suggested, they are almost consumer preferences. Be-
cause you choose freely, you must also bear responsibility for the conse-
quences of these choices. If you choose to come to the Netherlands, 
learning Dutch is your responsibility. If you are refused a job because you 
wear a headscarf, your socio-economic hardship results from your free 
choice. Identity is the sum total of all your personal choices.25
3. A privatization of identities. Expressions of personal identity outside the 
private sphere often meet with little tolerance. Examples are criticism of 
head scarves and mosques, but also of speaking foreign languages in pub-
lic. There is little tolerance of deviant behavior in the public space. Devi-
ance is allowed, provided no one can see it.
4. An understanding of equality as conformity to the average or standard citi-
zen. Since the revision of the Dutch Constitution, in 1983, equality has 
become a more fundamental norm in Dutch law and society. The first 
article of the amended Constitution stipulates that: “All persons in the 
Netherlands shall be treated equally in equal circumstances. Discrimina-
tion on the grounds of religion, belief, political opinion, race or sex or on 
any other grounds whatsoever shall not be permitted.” From a liberal per-
spective, this is entirely right, because equality is the foundational princi-
ple of a liberal democracy.26 Yet, as Schinkel and Van Houdt showed, in 
25 This voluntaristic understanding of identity was fiercely criticized in the liberal- 
communitarian debate of the 1980s and 1990s. Michael Sandel called this liberal view of 
citizens as individuals who could be whatever they wanted to be, the view of the “unen-
cumbered self.” According to Sandel, this concept of the self was sociologically naïve. 
People are social creatures, and their choices and preferences are, always and unavoid-
ably, profoundly affected by the social and cultural setting in which they grow up and live. 
For persons, there is no way to break out of the existential setting that made them what 
they are, to decide what they really want to be (Michael Sandel, “The Procedural Republic 
and the Unencumbered Self”, 11 Political Theory (1984)).
26 It may be helpful to put the development in historical perspective. Until the revision of 
the Dutch Constitution, in 1983, equality before the law was only a minor constitutional 
provision. In 1983, however, a broad equality clause became Article 1 of the Dutch 
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policy discourse there has been a shift from a pluralist to an assimilation-
ist understanding of basic equality. They argued that the understanding 
of equality has shifted from a right to be different to a duty to be similar 
to the standard Dutch citizen, that is, a citizen who holds Dutch norms 
and values, which “are seen as ‘modern’, which means ‘secular’, meaning: 
‘non-religious’, ‘individualist’, ‘egalitarian’.”27 This is the context in which 
the orthodox Calvinist party, sgp, complained, not without justification, 
that an ideology of equality has become oppressive.28 Equality is increas-
ingly interpreted substantively as equality to the standard citizen. In a 
way, this harkens back to the classic problem of democratic society, first 
noted by Tocqueville, that equality can lead to conformity and a tyranny 
of the majority.29 The liberal-progressive consensus that Duyvendak and 
Kennedy uncovered is not only a sign of openness to difference, but can 
also be seen as a norm that people are expected to conform to. Believers 
are accepted, as long as their behavior does not deviate from the secular 
norm, and their religion is something they keep at home. Migrants should 
simply speak Dutch, like everyone else.
5. Related to characteristic (4) is an appropriation of the French republican 
view on citizenship. There is an increased focus on active citizenship, civic 
virtues, and “normen en waarden,” or norms and values. The “operative 
image,” Schinkel and Van Houdt noted, “is that of the good citizen as a 
working (‘participating’) citizen,” not only economically, but also cultur-
ally.30 Increasingly, there is a wish to view citizenship as a shared identity, 
rather than a role or status that confers rights.31 Citizens are expected to 
participate in public institutions, such as schools and associations. A citi-
zen is not merely a voter or a carrier of rights, but should adopt vaguely 
 Constitution. Only in the decades after 1983 did this Article gradually gain broad accep-
tance as the most fundamental clause of the Constitution. See Wibren van der Burg, “The 
Irony of a Symbolic Crusade: The Debate on Opening Up Civil Marriages to Same-Sex 
Couples”, in Nicolle Zeegers et al. (eds.), Social and Symbolic Effects of Legislation Under 
the Rule of Law (2005).
27 Schinkel and Van Houdt, supra note 24 at 700.
28 Barbara Oomen et al., “cedaw, the Bible and the state of the Netherlands: the struggle 
over orthodox women’s political participation and their responses”, 6(2) Utrecht Law Re-
view (2010), 158.
29 See Alexis de Toqueville, Democracy in America, Vol. i & ii (1945) 1835, 1840, Vol. 1, ch. xv.
30 Schinkel and Van Houdt, supra note 24 at 705.
31 Herman van Gunsteren criticized this as a culturalization of citizenship. For Van Gun-
steren, citizenship should be about freedom and autonomy, but he argued that this cul-
turalization of citizenship leads to a form of control by setting cultural norms (Bouwen op 
burgers: Cultuur, preventie en de eigenzinnige burger (2008), 37ff.).
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defined Dutch “norms and values,” act civilly, and show active commit-
ment to common projects. These projects, however, should not be sectar-
ian, but should have value for the general public good. Active engage-
ment in ethnic churches, mosques, or other ethnic organizations is 
regarded as sectarian and as a sign of failed integration.
6. A culture of rising moral expectations. The idea that since the 1960s we 
have entered an era of greater individual liberty is contradicted by soci-
ologist Gabriel van den Brink. He observed that the mutual demands of 
citizens on one another have increased.32 Certain behavior that was sim-
ply tolerated until recently is now rejected. The morality of the majority 
has increasingly become a tight moral code. There is a dynamic toward 
ever greater perfectibility, in more and more areas, and citizens are ex-
pected to conform to the majority. The expectation is that fellow citizens 
live up to the socially liberal consensus that for many defines the very 
essence of Dutch citizenhood.
These different characteristics of the majority consensus show clear traces of 
their theoretical origins. The emphases on liberty and on free choice are classic 
liberal elements. The privatization of identities, the idea of equality as confor-
mity with the standard citizen, and the republican view on citizenship, in turn, 
fit more easily with the French republican tradition and with the renewed em-
phasis on a shared, liberal-progressive national identity. Characteristic (6) is a 
sign of illiberalism rather than liberalism, and shows how the embracing of the 
ideal of modernity and of a progressive liberal society can lead to moral con-
formity and intolerance for deviant minorities.
As noted above, there is an unresolved tension in the dominant ideology 
between the classic liberal, French-republican, and progressivism-as-national-
identity strands, which is reinforced by decreased tolerance. For example, as 
Duyvendak noted with respect to the current consensus on Dutch identity, citi-
zens simultaneously embrace the notion that the state should be strictly secu-
lar and neutral and that Dutch culture is a product of the Judeo-Christian 
 tradition, with Christian holidays being part of our shared national identity 
that should not be changed to accommodate citizens from a different religious 
background.33 In a similar vein, in an article on the emergence of the liberal-
progressive national identity, Samira van Bohemen, Roy Kemmers, and Willem 
de Koster noted that opinion grouped around two distinct clusters, where 
32 Gabriel van den Brink, “Hoger, harder, sneller en de prijs die men daarvoor betaalt”, in P.T. 
de Beer & C.J.M. Schuyt (eds.), Bijdragen aan waarden en normen (wrr-verkenning 2) 
(2004). For a similar conclusion with regard to the increasing demands that second- and 
third-generation migrants must meet, see Han Entzinger and Edith Dourleijn, De lat 
steeds hoger. De leefwereld van jongeren in een multi-etnische stad (2008).
33 Duyvendak supra note 22, at 16.
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Dutch people who achieved a higher education tended to embrace the 
 liberal-progressive consensus in a cosmopolitan way that was open to foreign 
cultures and Islam, and those who achieved a lower education tended to em-
brace the liberal-progressive consensus in an exclusive and ethnocentric way 
that rejected other ethnic groups and Islam as a threat to Dutch liberal- 
progressive identity.34 This suggests that there are some deep fissures within 
the liberal-progressive consensus, with one section favoring diversity and 
openness, and another embracing national identity and cultural unity.35 Con-
sequently, a clear alternative model for the toleration of religious minorities 
may not ensue from the new secular majority described by Kennedy and 
Duyvendak.
4 A “Protestant” Understanding of Religion
In Dutch public debate and legal discourse today, many believe that religion is 
fundamentally a text-based phenomenon. It is an understanding of religion 
closely akin to the once dominant Protestant understanding, and a frame36 
shared by the extremes in the debate about secularism and religion: zealous 
secularists as well as orthodox Muslims and fundamentalist Christians focus 
primarily on the text.37 The text-based approach is problematic, however. As 
Ruud Koopmans noted, secular critics who argue that fundamentalist inter-
pretations of the Bible or the Quran are the only “true” interpretations of Chris-
tianity or Islam, adopt the same position as fundamentalists who want to 
 return to the literal truth of the holy texts.38 Yet, this text-based approach is 
only one of many different ways of interpreting a religious tradition, which 
casts religion as a set of rules, precepts, and dogmas based on sacred texts such 
as the Bible and the Quran. These rules are categorical (rather than, for exam-
ple, based on a virtue ethics, as in Catholic theology). This frame can be char-
acterized as Protestant, because the first two of the classic Protestant solae are 
central. It may be described by five broad characteristics:
34 Bohemen et al., supra note 23, at 208–209.
35 In a way, this is also evident in the political parties that represent this consensus in parlia-
ment. They range from the Green Left party and the progressive liberal D66, to the conser-
vative liberal vvd and the nationalist, anti-Islam party, pvv.
36 The notion of frame is derived from Donald A. Schön and Martin Rein, Frame Reflection. 
Toward the Resolution of Intractable Policy Controversies (1994), 23. Frames can be defined 
as “underlying structures of belief, perception and appreciation.”
37 See, for example, Herman Philipse, Atheïstisch manifest en de onredelijkheid van religie 
(2004); Paul Cliteur, The Secular Outlook (2010).
38 Koopmans, supra note 17, at 7.
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1. Religious texts are central (sola scriptura). In orthodox Protestantism, 
Scripture is fundamental; many discussions, at times leading to church 
secessions, focus on the correct interpretation. Dutch public debate, and 
frequently also Dutch legal argument, seems to proceed from the premise 
that this holds for religion generally. The popular Dutch legal philosopher 
and secularist, Paul Cliteur, argued that a religion should literally be tak-
en to be what its authoritative texts say it is, not what religious groups 
metaphorically interpret it to be in a modern context. The texts of the 
Abrahamic religions contain clear and literal instigations to violence and 
intolerance, he claims, and propagate a theology of terror.39 The assump-
tion seems to be that true believers must take the text of the Bible or the 
Quran literally—other interpretations cannot be taken seriously. A clas-
sic legal example was provided by a lower Dutch court, the district judge 
of Zevenbergen. In violation of environmental regulations, a Hindu had 
strewn cremation ashes in a small river. The Hindu’s appeal to religious 
freedom was denied, because, according to the judge, there was no au-
thoritative basis for such a religious duty in Hindu sacred writings. The 
Hindu in question, in other words, was judged by the Protestant criterion 
of being true to the text. Yet, while Hindus know certain writings with a 
special status, in contradistinction to Protestantism, these writings do 
not constitute the basis for their religious practices.40
2. The doctrinal contents of religious beliefs are central (sola fide). Religion is 
regarded primarily as a doctrine, a set of religious dogmas. Within such a 
doctrinal model of religion, orthodox belief is the paradigm. Religions 
that emphasize praxis, especially spirituality, ritual, and ethics, do not fit 
this frame. A doctrinal model of religion is dominant in law as well. It 
employs infelicitous wording such as “religious expressions” and “views 
of life,” suggesting that religious freedom, as a variety of freedom of ex-
pression, protects merely the expression of religious views and not reli-
gious practice. This doctrinal, rather than praxis-oriented, conception 
also plays a role in the debate on head scarves, which are often regarded 
as expressions of religious convictions, comparable to the wearing a cross 
or a political sign. Yet, there is a range of reasons why women wear heads-
carves. For many women, covering their hair is regarded not as an expres-
sion of religious faith but as a religious practice, based on a religious ob-
ligation (just like covering their breasts). Wearing a cross, by contrast, is 
39 Paul Cliteur, Het monotheïstisch dilemma: of De theologie van het terrorisme (2010), 153–
154. Since Spring 2019, Cliteur is the leader of the Forum voor Democratie party in the 
Dutch Senate.
40 Kantonrechter Zevenbergen, 3 februari 1982, njcm-Bulletin 1982, 418.
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usually not considered a religious obligation and involves primarily the 
display of a religious symbol. Therefore, the legal protection of wearing a 
cross can often be adequately analyzed in terms of freedom of expres-
sion, whereas donning a headscarf must often be analyzed in terms of the 
right to live according to one’s religion.
3. Religious norms must be regarded as categorical rules. In orthodox Protes-
tantism, religious norms are categorical: they hold always and every-
where (Immanuel Kant was a typical Protestant). But there are also reli-
gions and spiritual practices that focus on spiritual growth, like Buddhism 
and Freemasonry, involving stages of religious development. Many Mus-
lim women start wearing a headscarf only after a certain age, after they 
reach a certain stage in their religious development. In a Protestant 
frame, however, this suggests insincerity, or at least the notion that if 
wearing a headscarf is not a categorical obligation, it is probably not an 
important one and need not be taken seriously as a religious obligation.
4. Orthodox Protestantism is the archetype for understanding religion. In the 
Netherlands, Islam is frequently understood by comparison to Dutch or-
thodox groups. According to the New Testament, women should cover 
their head during church service because they are subservient to men.41 
Until recently, the Netherlands even knew a small party that opposed the 
right of women to hold political office on these biblical grounds.42 The 
Quran dictates the covering of certain parts of the body as a protection 
against sexual temptation, for both men and women. This is primarily a 
motive based on sexual morality.43 These differences make it problemat-
ic to interpret the headscarf in a sweeping fashion as a sign of gender 
discrimination.
5. Religions take shape in hierarchical, strongly institutionalized organiza-
tions. Most traditional Christian churches are well organized, hierarchi-
cal organizations with synods, bishops, and popes. The history of the 
West is one of rivalry and conflict between churches and states over 
which institution has supreme authority. In most Western countries, this 
41 1 Corinthians 11: 3–16.
42 sgp, the Political Reformed Party, the oldest party of the Netherlands. See Staat-
kundig Gereformeerde Partij, Supreme Court of the Netherlands, (9 April 2010), 
ecli:NL:HR:2010:BK4549. The same case was brought before the European Court of Hu-
man Rights: Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij v. the Netherlands (10 July 2012), Application 
no. 58369/10. The ECtHR qualified the party’s point of view as “unacceptable regardless of 
the deeply-held religious conviction on which it has been based.” The party changed its 
rules, and in 2014 its first female local councilor was elected.
43 This textual interpretation is often intermingled with cultural understanding about the 
subservience of women.
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has led to a separation of church and state, albeit rarely a strict one.44 The 
legal doctrine of separation of church and state does not focus on the 
content of policies and law, but on institutional power. The church should 
not have institutional influence over the state, and vice versa. Separation 
of church and state does not mean that law should not embody religious 
norms, however. That is an issue of state neutrality. Legal norms in many 
countries still enforce some traditional Christian norms, for example, on 
marriage and euthanasia.45
In Islam, and especially in religions like Buddhism or Hinduism, simi-
lar authoritative institutions are absent. Generally, religious leaders have 
a spiritual authority, but only limited secular authority, usually in matters 
of family law. (There are some exceptions, as in the case of Iran, with its 
distinct version of Shia.) Yet, in the Dutch public debate, the role of 
imams and religious organizations is interpreted in the frame of orga-
nized Christianity, as if they were institutions that wield power and exert 
doctrinal authority, as Christian leaders and churches once did. In short, 
it is not always appropriate to use the  traditional framework of separa-
tion of church and state, with its focus on institutionalized religion, for 
addressing the relations between the non-Christian religions and the 
state.
These five characteristics of the Protestant conception of religion are, of 
course, ideal typical. They are not always all present in public discourse or in 
the self-understanding of orthodox religious groups. The institutional dimen-
sion, for example, is not always present. The characteristics clearly apply to 
orthodox Calvinist groups, once a culturally dominant force in the Nether-
lands, but today only a small percentage of the Dutch population. They fit rela-
tively well fundamentalist Muslims, but not fully. For example, many Muslim 
fundamentalists have moved away from the notion that religious authorities 
interpret the Quran toward a Western individualist (and in a sense also Protes-
tant) approach according to which individual believers interpret the sacred 
texts autonomously.46
44 Cf. the seats of Anglican Bishops in the House of Lords, or the position of the British 
Queen as head of the Anglican Church.
45 This may be in conflict with state neutrality, but is not a violation of the separation of 
state and church. See Roland Pierik and Wibren van der Burg, “What is Neutrality?”, 27(4) 
Ratio Juris (2014), 496.
46 Oliver Roy, for example, argued that the deterritorialization of Islam, i.e., the fact that for 
many Muslims in the diaspora religion is no longer embedded in religious institutions or 
in the social and cultural fabric of their daily lives, as is the case in Muslim majority coun-
tries, leads to a Protestantization of Islam, a personal reconstruction of Islam on the basis 
of religious texts (Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah (2004), 26–29; Secular-
ism Confronts Islam (2007), 70–77), Islam might also invite such a text-oriented approach. 
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Unfortunately, this Protestant frame hides from view more liberal, praxis-
oriented religions, dynamic and pluralist interpretations of religion, and post-
modern religious bricolages. If religions are reduced to authoritative texts that 
dictate rigid precepts, attempts to combine religion and liberal democracy are 
well-nigh impossible from the outset. If one adopts this narrow conception of 
religion, it becomes easy to deny the empirical given that a majority of Euro-
pean Muslims accept the values of liberal democracy and to claim that every 
true believer must be an orthodox believer—a recurrent theme from Ayaan 
Hirsi Ali to Geert Wilders, who regard every liberal Muslim a hypocrite.47 This 
leads to a reduction and fixation of religious identities to their extreme ver-
sions, defended only by small minorities.
5 Hybridization, Fragmentation, and Networked Communities
Cutting across the rise of a secular moral majority in the Netherlands is a trend 
toward hybridization and fragmentation. With the explosion of social media, 
mobile telephony, networked communication, and the democratization of 
mass media, the public is disaggregating into insular and inward-looking 
groups. Manuel Castells has called this new type of communication a form of 
“mass self-communication,” in which ordinary citizens can reach potentially 
global audiences with low-budget operations.48 This shift from old-fashioned 
mass communication from the few to the many to democratized communica-
tion from the many to the many leads to a world of choice, in which a large 
number of secular and religious views of the good are on offer. On one hand, 
this creates conditions for a hybridization of identity, for a certain postmod-
ern, pick-and-mix approach to identity. On the other hand, many-to-many 
mass communication also creates conditions for a balkanization of the public 
into so-called “filter bubbles,” closed and inward-looking communities of like-
minded people who communicate only with each other.
The Quran is understood to have been revealed to Muhammad by God through the 
 Archangel Gabriel. As a text, it is sacred; a literal, uncreated transcript of God’s speech. 
This is why there is so much emphasis on the recitation of the Quran in Islam, and why 
verses of the Quran are reproduced on the walls of Mosques.
47 Ayaan Hirsi Ali, “Open brief aan burgemeester Job Cohen”, in Trouw (6 March 2004). 
Wilders and his political theoretician, Martin Bosma, started a debate about the unreli-
ability of Muslims, because they are allowed, or even obliged, to hide their true inten-
tions, based on the Islamic dogma of taqqiya. See the interview with Martin Bosma, in 
nrc Handelsblad (25 September 2010); cf. Proceedings of the Dutch Lower House of the 
States-General, 2010–2011, Regeringsverklaring/algemene politieke beschouwingen, (26 
October 2010), at 13–58 ff.
48 Manuel Castells, Communication Power (2009).
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Focusing on the hybridization aspect of this development, the Dutch Scien-
tific Council for Government Policy has claimed that the Netherlands is cur-
rently experiencing a fragmentation of identities.49 Hybridization is a process 
in which citizens combine elements from different cultures and traditions to 
create their own complex, multi-layered, cultural and religious identity, for ex-
ample, as a liberal Muslim who is critically loyal to both Moroccan and Dutch 
culture.50 In the old days of pillarization, the delineated groups or pillars were 
fairly homogeneous. This segmented and uniform cultural structure has crum-
bled. Some of the formal institutions are still partly in place, but people no 
longer live their social lives within their own pillar, their own closed commu-
nity, or their own religious group. There is something resembling a mini-pillar 
for orthodox Protestants, to be sure, but even that community is not as her-
metic as it once was. Although there still may be a core group of orthodox 
Protestants that live a rather isolated life, both socially and geographically, the 
orthodox Protestant pillar also contains people with hybrid orientations, who 
live their life partly within the confines of the schools, families, newspapers, 
and political parties belonging to the pillar, and partly in wider secular Dutch 
society. These individuals with hybrid orientations form a bridge between the 
pillar and the secular environment.
Similarly, some migrant communities consist of small groups that have little 
contact outside of their religious and ethnic community, if only because of the 
language barrier, and larger groups with a hybrid identification that fully par-
ticipate in wider Dutch society. Hybrid identification processes are especially 
common among second- and third-generation migrants, who identify with 
Dutch society and its liberal-democratic values as well as with their country of 
origin and their family religion. They construct their own hybrid identity. Their 
children celebrate Christmas at their Protestant school (Jesus is a Muslim 
prophet too), Muslim festivals at home, and King’s Day as members of Dutch 
society.
In classic immigrant societies like Australia, Canada, and the United States, 
hyphenated identities are a well-known phenomenon. What seems to be new 
49 wrr, supra note 8.
50 According to Jos de Mul (“Database Identity: Personal and Cultural Identity in the Age of 
Global Datafication”, in Wouter de Been et al. (eds.), Crossroads in New Media, Identity and 
Law: The Shape of Diversity to Come (2015)), because of the digital information and com-
munication technologies that developed in the last few decades, there has been a “quali-
tative rupture” caused by the datafication of our world. This has affected how people 
shape their identity. De Mul talks about the emergence of a “database identity,” where 
people shop around and construct their own identity with the use of deconstructed and 
datafied building blocks from different cultural traditions.
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is the variation in hybrid identifications and their intense dynamics. Informa-
tion and communication technologies appear to have intensified diversifica-
tion and hybridization. Moreover, hybrid identities are new to Dutch society, 
which historically has been accustomed to clearly demarcated pillars, with 
authoritative elites defining the shared identity. There is not one group of 
Moroccan- Dutch citizens; many Dutch people from Moroccan descent make 
their own combination of elements from the various cultural attributes they 
are acquainted with. There is also not a single Turkish-Dutch identity, as it be-
came abundantly clear during the Turkish constitutional referendum of 2017 
and its reverberations throughout the Turkish diaspora, but multiple identities 
that reflect cultural and religious divisions in the country of origin and differ-
ent levels of adjustment to life in the Netherlands.
The circumstances that facilitate and encourage hybridity also affect the lib-
eral progressive “moral majority” that Duyvendak and Kennedy uncovered. To 
a certain extent, members of this majority also have composite identities. The 
new Dutch liberal-progressive consensus, as we saw, draws on a set of beliefs 
that vary widely and pull in different directions. There is a range of possibilities 
in how secular Dutch people combine these elements. Highly mobile, educat-
ed cosmopolitans may combine them with strong international orientations, 
whereas others may connect them with their sense of Dutch national identi-
ty.51 In a way, this reflects the divide between what are now often called “global-
ists” and “nationalists,” or the “citizens of nowhere” and the “citizens of 
 somewhere,” a divide that has emerged not only in the Netherlands, but in 
several of the other older liberal democracies. It is a division between what 
Stephan Shakespeare, the head of British research data group, YouGov, color-
fully called “drawbridge up” and “drawbridge down” constituencies.52 If you are 
in favor of open borders, embrace diversity, welcome international coopera-
tion, and believe that globalization is a boon, you are a drawbridge-down type 
of person. If, however, you believe in rigorously guarded borders, shared 
 cultural norms, national sovereignty, and protection against the ravages of in-
ternational competition, you are a drawbridge-up kind of person. These basic 
attitudes translate into divergent answers from within the liberal-progressive 
consensus to the questions posed by religious diversity and the accommo-
dation of religious minorities. For a drawbridge-down person, the liberal- 
progressive consensus suggests that we should embrace and accommodate the 
51 Bohemen et al., supra note 23, at 208–209.
52 Shakespeare is quoted in The Economist (July 30 2016), at 16. For the division between 
globalists and nationalists, see, e.g., Jonathan Haidt, The Righteous Mind: Why Good People 
are Divided by Politics and Religion (2012); “The Ethics of Globalism, Nationalism and 
 Patriotism”, 9(3) Minding Nature (2016), 18.
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religions of minorities and immigrants as a matter of principle. Cultural and 
religious diversity is something that liberal democracies are supposed to pro-
tect and foster. For a drawbridge-up person, however, the liberal-progressive 
consensus is a standard that minorities and migrants need to internalize, a 
modern Western identity into which they need to assimilate. Religious groups, 
especially those that are not part of the Judeo-Christian tradition, can be 
resisted.
The liberal-progressive consensus need not necessarily be secular. It may be 
combined with vaguely spiritual, with non-religious, but also with orthodox 
religious convictions. Although only a minority of Dutch people still identify as 
members of a church or organized religious group, a substantial minority iden-
tifies as religious without strong connections to religious institutions. They be-
lieve that there is “something,” a religious force or spirit, or at least more than 
meets the eye.53 They have become spiritual nomads, shopping in the market-
place of various religious traditions. They may go to a Christmas service, send 
their children to a religious school to acquaint them with their religious heri-
tage, and at the same time practice meditation drawing on the Buddhist tradi-
tion, resulting in a religious bricolage. These hybrid identifications are not 
fixed, but have a variable, dynamic character.
The process of fragmentation and hybridization of identities may be an in-
dication of a growing individualization and a diminishing need to treat reli-
gion as a collective phenomenon. But this is not the only story of diversity in 
the 21st century. There are also trends that reinforce religion as a collective 
phenomenon, that facilitate the groupishness of religious experience. The 
fragmentation of religion is closely bound up with a second trend, a change in 
the nature of communication, with people increasingly tied into networked 
communities. The Internet, social media, mobile phones, and satellite TV pro-
vide the opportunity to belong to geographically dispersed communities of 
likeminded people. Individuals sort themselves into such groups through the 
Internet and social media, forming networks on the basis of shared sexual, re-
ligious, or cultural identities. At times, these become so homogeneous that 
they turn into “filter bubbles,” monocultures of likeminded people who con-
stantly reinforce each other’s beliefs.54 Although membership in these groups 
is loose, they nevertheless are creating a public sphere that is increasingly di-
vided into a patchwork of inward-looking and internally homogeneous 
53 The Dutch politician Ronald Plasterk coined the word ietsisten (“somethingists”) for this 
group.
54 Eli Pariser, The Filter Bubble: What the Internet is Hiding from You (2011), 9–20; for an early 
visionary account, see also Cass Sunstein, Republic.com (Princeton University Press, 2001).
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 communities, vaguely reminiscent of the old Dutch pillars. In the time of pil-
larization, the membership of almost all groups to which someone belonged 
was located within the old, densely-knit communities, where one met the 
same people in the political party, the church, the school board, the sports 
club, and other social organizations. In the more fragmented society of today, 
the networks are more fluid.55
Another feature of the new networked communities is that they are not tied 
to national geography. Diaspora communities and religious groups can main-
tain intensive contacts across borders, especially with their countries of ori-
gin.56 Through social media, satellite TV, mobile phones, and cheap flights, it is 
much easier to connect with countries of origin than it was for previous gen-
erations of migrants. Turkish-Dutch citizens can read Turkish newspapers on 
the Internet, watch Turkish television through satellite, and keep in contact 
with Turkey through regular visits and cheap phone calls. These networked 
diaspora communities have hybrid identities, as they may consists of Turkish 
migrants from various countries—all of them partly influenced by the country 
of settlement. They are loose communities, in the sense that people can rela-
tively easily dissociate themselves from them, but this looseness does not 
mean that the influence of these networks cannot be profound. Protests by 
parts of the Turkish community in Europe in the run-up to the constitutional 
referendum in 2017 are an example of the power of networks. These networked 
transnational communities no longer fit the paradigm of the nation state; they 
transcend borders, and it is difficult for states to control them.
At times, these processes are enhanced by more traditional forms of state 
support. State organizations in the countries of origin, like the Turkish Diyanet, 
maintain ties with their diaspora communities by building mosques and train-
ing imams. Charities, especially in many Gulf states, offer financial support for 
Islamic organizations abroad as a way of spreading their strict Salafi strain of 
Sunni Islam. Some authors are more concerned by these types of cross-border 
support than others. Ruud Koopmans argued that Saudi Arabia and other Gulf 
states have had great success in spreading fundamentalist Islam across the 
globe and in the Netherlands through schools and religious organizations.57 A 
recent study by the Verwey-Jonker Instituut, however, found that although 
there were efforts, mainly by Saudi Arabia, to spread Salafi Islam, the effects 
55 Wouter de Been, “Playing around With a Few of Your Favorite Things: Freedom and Con-
tinuity on the Internet”, in Wouter de Been et al. (eds.), Crossroads in New Media, Identity 
and Law: The Shape of Diversity to Come (2015), 58–59.
56 Wouter de Been, “Continuity or regime change in the Netherlands: Consociationalism in 
a deterritorialized and post-secular world”, 12(5) Ethnicities (2012), 545.
57 Koopmans, supra  note 17, at 218, 227–228.
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were mixed and unclear. Other nations, like Morocco, actively support anti-
Salafi programs in the Netherlands. According to the study, Salafi Muslims are 
a highly diverse group, in which a small minority remains at odds with Western 
liberal democracy. Most, however, are trying to fit their religious life into the 
framework of Dutch law, even if reluctantly.58 For Koopmans, the foreign influ-
ence on Dutch Muslims is a reason to reconsider the accommodation of Islam 
in the Netherlands. It is possible to argue, however, that such accommodation 
makes sure that Dutch Muslims are not dependent entirely on foreign funding 
to organize their institutions, and that Islamic schools are tied into the Dutch 
system and offer education that is consistent with the values of liberal 
democracy.
6 Consequences of the Marginalization and Privatization of Religion 
for Democratic Culture
After we sketched these three trends or phenomena, we can now address their 
implications for the accommodation of religious diversity. The rise of the new 
moral majority has led to a growing unfamiliarity with religion, which has bred 
a lack of understanding. Large parts of the Dutch population have become 
 religiously aloof. Whether it is wearing a headscarf, not drinking alcohol, or 
rejecting non-marital sex, persons holding these views are considered to be 
alien to the liberal and secular worldview. This lack of understanding may be 
associated with the general process of secularization, which for many Dutch 
citizens has merged with their self-image as members of a liberal-progressive 
and fundamentally secular nation that has transcended religion. This self- 
image may be a way for these citizens to distinguish themselves from migrant 
groups with more traditional views. But the unfamiliarity with religion may 
also derive from the French republican elements in the majority consensus, 
especially the non-sectarian view of public citizenship and the public domain, 
in which there is no place for manifestations of religious identity. If religious 
identities are in this way privatized and marginalized, citizens are no longer 
regularly confronted with religious beliefs and practices, and no longer have 
the opportunity, let alone experience the need, to learn about them. Those 
who rarely come in contact with religious behavior must make a greater effort 
to come to terms with such behavior and find ways to accommodate it. This 
effort is even more challenging if the behavior is framed as irrational and 
58 Maurits Berger et al., Salafisme in Nederland belicht: Vijftien jaar Salafisme onderzoek in 
Nederland (2018), 31–33.
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 premodern. Therefore, the diminishing understanding of religious minorities, 
and empathy for them leads to a reduction of support for the Dutch liberal 
tradition of mutual accommodation of religious minorities, as well as for the 
democratic rights of religious minorities.
7 Consequences for Constitutional Rights and Principles
The complex makeup of today’s diversity suggests a problem of a legal- 
technical nature. Legislation works with general categories; law always has a 
tendency to generalize. Yet, if the old groups, the old “pillars,” fade away and are 
 replaced with a complex landscape in which many citizens adopt highly indi-
vidual and fluid hybrid identities, while others are locked into inward-looking 
networked communities and some remain loyal to their traditional communi-
ties, it becomes more difficult to devise one-size-fits-all legal instruments to 
accommodate everybody.
The current understanding of various constitutional rights in the Nether-
lands has an orientation toward groups and organizations; partly because of 
the history of pillarization, and partly because for the exercise of some rights, 
organizations such as schools and churches are essential. According to Mi-
chael Walzer, as a regime of tolerance, consociationalism is characterized by 
groups tolerating each other as groups, letting each group live according to its 
religious or ideological preferences and principles. When circumstances 
change, and one of the groups becomes dominant, however, like the secular 
majority in the Netherlands today, the ideal typical regime of tolerance tends 
to become that of the nation state. In the regime of tolerance of the nation 
state, tolerance is typically focused not on groups, but on their individual 
members, who are conceived of as citizens, first, and members of a minority 
group, second.59 Even today, the Dutch system is still characterized by groups 
tolerating each other as groups. Freedom of education is implemented through 
large school organizations that largely still reflect the traditional religious and 
secular communities. The legal framework of religious freedom is also strongly 
based on recognizing religious communities and organizations. Most religions 
are organized in collective institutions such as churches and mosques. If 
 divergent views are clearly confined to and univocally expressed within recog-
nizable and relatively closed communities, like those of the Mennonites and 
Jehovah’s Witnesses, it is much easier to accommodate members of these 
59 See: Michael Walzer, supra note 2 at 22–30.
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groups, than when individual citizens construct their own unique religious 
view.
Hence, the question is whether the traditional Dutch orientation toward 
groups and organizations should be retained, or whether, for example, free-
dom of religion should be recast as an individual right in the private sphere. 
The Netherlands currently hovers somewhere between Walzer’s consociation-
al and nation-state models of toleration. Dutch society has become much 
more individualized. Yet, despite a clear movement in the Netherlands away 
from the stifling religious and ideological segmentation of the days of pillariza-
tion, toward a more fluid and individualistic society, many citizens did not sud-
denly stop acting like social beings. Undoubtedly, there is less deference to 
tradition and less respect for the authority of cultural and religious elites than 
in the 1950s and 1960s, but groups, associations, churches, clubs, and today, 
social networks and Internet communities remain important sources of iden-
tity. Social groups have not disappeared from the Netherlands; they have trans-
formed, loosened up, and in part turned into the networked communities of 
the digital age. Some of these communities seem quite capable of keeping 
their shared identity alive, independently of Dutch social institutions. The 
question is whether these new networked communities can be integrated into 
Dutch society through the old consociational arrangements, to the extent that 
they are still available. Is it better to let them look for funding and support from 
external parties, or to treat them as equals and make them part of the Dutch 
institutional landscape?
The liberal-progressive majority prefers to deal with cultural and religious 
diversity strictly in terms of individual rights. Although the accommodation of 
cultural and religious identity is changing, it remains important. For some 
groups, for example, the gay movement or for more liberal religious traditions, 
identities may have become more individualistic and fluid, and distinct groups, 
organizations, and institutions may have become less important.60 In other 
cases, however, groups, organizations, and institutions remain important for 
how individuals express their identities and organize their lives. Therefore, a 
group orientation should remain an option when it comes to facilitating reli-
gious and cultural diversity. The collective and institutional dimension of 
rights such as freedom of religion and freedom of education should be recog-
nized and not entirely reduced to the individual dimension.61
60 The gay movement has become more individualistic and inclusive, with increasingly 
open and fluid boundaries, as attested to by the addition of various letters in recent years, 
adding up to lgbtqiap+.
61 To avoid misunderstanding, this accommodation of group identities should not go so far, 
as it does in some radical relativist positions, that the rights of the group should trump 
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Clearly, the combination of the rise of a liberal-republican majority ideolo-
gy, its expression as a substantive notion of Dutch citizenship, and the 
 increasing fragmentation of society present important challenges to Dutch 
democratic culture and its notions of liberal rights. Some constitutional rights 
and principles may have to be rethought, and their accepted interpretation 
and implementation may have to change to reflect the changes that have tak-
en  place in the Netherlands. These include freedom of education, freedom 
of  religion, the right to non-discrimination, state neutrality, and freedom of 
expression. We can merely identify the challenges here, as there are no easy 
solutions.
7.1 Freedom of Education
First and foremost, freedom of education. The Dutch system of full funding for 
private schools with a distinct religious or pedagogical character is another 
legacy of the pillarized past. It was created in 1917, as part of a broad  compromise, 
and it is unique in the world.62 At the time, it was defended as a compromise 
between the various religious and secular pillars, but also for taking the prefer-
ences of parents seriously. It is difficult to justify such a collective right within 
a classic liberal or a national-progressivist framework, however; it is even more 
difficult to do so within a republican framework. Moreover, the way in which it 
is implemented in the Netherlands today, through the legal recognition and 
protection of an oligopoly of a small number of religious school organizations, 
with little influence from parents or students, is at odds with the increasing 
fragmentation of identities and with the egalitarian demand for democratic 
influence. Despite the fact that the Dutch school system remains surprisingly 
popular—many secular parents seem to believe that it is important to expose 
their children to their religious heritage—there is clear opposition to the con-
tinued overrepresentation of religion in the Dutch school system. Jaap 
Dronkers noted that the “differences between public and religious schools in 
the Netherlands are more cultural than material, more school- climate differ-
ences than factual operation differences,” but it still seems appropriate that 
more schools represent a secular culture and create a secular school climate 
individual freedoms. The accommodation of groups should take place within the limits of 
liberal democracy, and therefore always respect individual rights.
62 Ben Vermeulen et al., “The European Convention on Human Rights and the Dutch educa-
tional system”, in Jan de Groof and Gracienne Lauwers (eds.), No person shall be denied the 
right of education. The influence of the European Convention on Human Rights on the right 
to education and rights in education (2004); Paul Zoontjens and Charles Glenn, “The Neth-
erlands”, in Charles Glenn & Jan de Groof (eds.), Balancing Freedom, Autonomy and Ac-
countability in Education, (2012) Volume 2.
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that reflects the growing secularism of Dutch society.63 At the same time, the 
sizable Muslim minority should be allowed to continue operating their own 
schools. Islamic schools have a bad reputation in the Netherlands, but accord-
ing to Jaap Dronkers this is undeserved, at least with regard to elementary 
schools. When you control for the socio-economic background of the parents, 
the performance of Islamic elementary schools is among the best in Holland. 
Islamic secondary schools have proven unsuccessful so far, however. According 
to Dronkers, this is because of the lack of “a well-educated and well-connected 
Islamic elite for the foundations and associations that establish and run the 
religious schools,” and because of “gender values and norms” that hamper per-
formance of both male and female children. Nevertheless, Dronkers believes 
that Islamic schools could be instrumental in bringing about the necessary ad-
justment of Islam to modernity.64
7.2 Freedom of Religion
A similar point can be made with regard to freedom of religion. An increasing 
number of authors have argued that freedom of religion is superfluous,  because 
other fundamental rights, like freedom of speech, freedom of association, and 
the principle of non-discrimination already adequately protect religious 
views.65 Admittedly, in a purely Protestant frame with an emphasis on the doc-
trinal aspects of religion, this may seem logical. When law and public debate 
no longer recognize religious praxis as part of religion in its own right, but 
merely reduce it to the expression of religious beliefs, freedom of religion be-
comes superfluous. Within a republican perspective premised on the absence 
of religion from the public sphere, the risk of conflict between religious and 
legal norms may seem minimal. Evidently, such a perspective provides little 
support for the accommodation of religious practices with a public dimension. 
Note, however, that this approach neglects the praxis-oriented and collective 
dimensions of religion. To substantiate the need for a distinct right of religious 
freedom, this challenge must be taken seriously.
63 Jaap Dronkers, “Islamic Primary Schools in the Netherlands”, 10 Journal of School Choice 
(2016), 8.
64 Ibid., at 18–19.
65 For Dutch authors, see Cliteur, supra note 37; Philipse, supra note 37. For an international 
discussion, see James Nickel, “Who Needs Freedom of Religion?”, 76 University of Colorado 
Law Review (2005), 941; Christopher L. Eisgruber and Lawrence G. Sager, Religious Free-
dom and the Constitution (2007); Brian Leiter, Why Tolerate Religion (2013). For a more 
general analysis, see Sohail Wahedi, “Abstraction from the Religious Dimension”, 24 Buf-
falo Human Rights Law Review (2017–2018), 1–44.
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7.3 Right to Non-Discrimination
Another right that is called into question is that of non-discrimination. Anti-
discrimination law is a highly controversial field. Opinions of the Netherlands 
Institute for Human Rights, formerly the Equal Treatment Commission, often 
meet with fierce criticism.66 The tensions between the liberal, republican, and 
progressive nationalist elements of the dominant ideology are most clearly 
 visible on this topic. Liberalism is highly sensitive to the protection of min-
orities against intolerant majorities, and therefore supports active anti- 
discrimination policies. French republicanism, by contrast, tries to abstract 
from religious and other identities, which in practice means that the majority 
standards  become the public norm, without room for deviation.67 Finally, pro-
gressive nationalists construct the liberal-progressive consensus as a defining 
characteristic of Dutch identity into which immigrants and minorities must 
assimilate. From a liberal point of view, we should try to accommodate minori-
ties, whereas from a republican and a progressive nationalist point of view, we 
should not. The result of an increasingly republican and progressive national-
ist culture is that there is less support for policies and legal instruments that 
promote religious and cultural equality through the accommodation of 
minorities.
7.4 State Neutrality
There are also implications for the interpretation of state neutrality. We may 
discern a shift from inclusive to exclusive neutrality. As a result of the changes 
described above, there is less support for inclusive forms of neutrality.  Inclusive 
neutrality, also known as evenhandedness, requires that public manifestations 
of religious and other minority identities be accepted and accommodated. It is 
a form of power sharing in the public sphere, based on the principle of propor-
tionality, central to the Dutch tradition of consociationalism, in which minori-
ties are respected and free to live according to their own beliefs. It is the notion 
behind the Dutch system of education, in which every organized religious or 
secular group is allowed to operate its own public schools, roughly in propor-
tion to the size of their communities. There is now a trend toward a stricter 
separation of state and religious organizations, similar to the current French 
interpretation of laïcité or exclusive neutrality.68 This is a system in which state 
institutions adopt a strict hands-off approach vis-à-vis the different ideas of 
66 In 2013, the Equal Treatment Commission was transformed into an organization with a 
broader task, the Netherlands Institute for Human Rights.
67 For abstraction, see Wahedi, supra note 65.
68 Pierik and Van der Burg, supra note 45.
10.1163/22124810-2019004 | van der Burg and de Been
<UN>
30
journal of law, religion and state (2020) 1-33
the good of its citizens, and toward religious organizations. The current notion 
of Dutch national identity as something that is related to the liberal, progres-
sive consensus gravitates toward a strictly secular public sphere.
7.5 Freedom of Expression
There is a different tendency with regard to freedom of expression. Traditional-
ly, in Dutch law there have been various restrictions on this freedom based on 
libel, defamation, and non-discrimination laws.69 In recent decades, however, 
the effective protection against hate speech has weakened. Hate speech is not 
mere speech. It often hurts people profoundly, and violates their self-respect, 
especially if it is aimed at minorities that are the victim of persistent discrimi-
nation, such as gays and Muslims. Speech against heterosexuals is not only 
rare, but also rarely causes harm, because they are not an oppressed minority. 
By contrast, anti-gay slurs are much more common and more hurtful, and they 
reinforce anti-gay sentiments. Similarly, anti-Muslim and anti-immigrant 
speech is dangerous and hurtful because its targets are marginal groups rather 
than secure and established communities. There are good reasons, therefore, 
not to import a libertarian view on free speech, like the one in the United 
States, but uphold the current legal restrictions. Nevertheless, the dominant 
republican frame undermines support for such restrictions. Why should we 
protect minorities against defamation if the majority, the standard person, 
does not need such protection? If a secularized citizen or liberal Christian does 
not mind that Christianity is criticized in hateful terms, why should it be differ-
ent for Muslims? This argument ignores obvious differences in power and sta-
tus between established groups within mainstream Dutch society and the 
marginal Muslim community, and neglects the vulnerability of socially disad-
vantaged groups.
7.6 Constitutional Rights and Principles
In this section, we have identified several key challenges to the traditional in-
terpretation of constitutional rights and principles in the Netherlands. They 
reveal two underlying tensions: (a) between liberal, republican, and progres-
sive nationalist elements; and (b) between the current implementation of 
those rights and principles in terms of groups, institutions and general catego-
ries, and the fragmentation and hybridization of identities in our pluralist so-
ciety. All constitutional rights and principles that are under pressure rely partly 
on group-sensitive measures and on acceptance of the public dimension of 
69 The statutory prohibition of blasphemy has been without effective enforcement since 
1966, and has only been removed on 1 February 2014.
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religious and cultural identities. Within a republican framework, these are 
more difficult to justify, and in a fragmented society with loose networked 
communities, they are more difficult to implement. These tensions cannot be 
easily resolved, and they threaten the legitimacy of legal institutions, such as 
the Netherlands Institute for Human Rights and the courts. Within a liberal 
framework, the role of the courts is often counter-majoritarian, and it involves 
the protection of minorities against intolerant majorities. Within a republican 
and a progressive nationalist framework, however, their role is to express the 
common identity, leaving less room for minorities.
8 Conclusion: Revisiting Consociationalism?
In this paper, we have identified three developments in Dutch society and 
 argued that they result in reduced support for the Dutch liberal tradition of 
mutual accommodation of religious minorities. Moreover, they present chal-
lenges to the current interpretation of constitutional rights and principles.
We cannot offer easy solutions to these tensions and challenges. Legal schol-
arship and practice can provide only a minor part of the solution by suggest-
ing changes to legal doctrine in light of changing social circumstances. One 
of the authors has done so with regard to the ideal of state neutrality, and ar-
gued that it should be reconstructed in a pluralist way. In most cases, the state 
should base its policies on inclusive neutrality, a form that tries to take into 
account culture and religion in the public sphere in an evenhanded way, and 
seeks to include all relevant views, controversial worldviews among them, in 
the decision- making process. In some cases, however, the state should focus on 
exclusive neutrality, the principle that underlies the French notion of laïcité, 
in which religious or cultural expressions should be excluded from the public 
sphere. Which of the two versions is to be preferred in what situation, cannot 
be decided a priori, but depends on a pragmatic and context-sensitive analysis. 
The notion of inclusive state neutrality has implications also for how freedom 
of education can be reconceived.70
Still, legal doctrine can only make a minor contribution here. The tensions 
are more political and social in nature than legal. Therefore, in dealing with 
religious diversity in the Netherlands, we should focus primarily on rethinking 
70 See Wibren van der Burg, “Inclusive Neutrality in the Classroom”, in G. Lauwers, J. De 
Groof and P. De Hert (eds.), Islam in State-Funded Schools. Religion and the Public Law 
Framework (2012), arguing that the notion of inclusive neutrality with regard to religion, 
views of life, culture, and sexual orientation (known in Belgium as “active pluralism”), 
should be a guiding principle for all schools and not only for public ones.
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the political arrangements and social culture. Naturally, we cannot elaborate a 
new social and political philosophy here, but our suggestion is that revisiting 
the tradition of consociationalism may be a successful strategy.71
Consociationalism is often reduced to pillarization, but in practice it is a 
broader approach. It includes a culture of power-sharing that is still very much 
alive in Dutch political and social culture, in the socio-economic poldermodel, 
and in the attempt to find relatively broad support for local and national gov-
ernments, and their most important policies.72 Governments in the Nether-
lands always must be based on coalitions, which requires fostering the art of 
compromise and mutual accommodation. It is mainly in the context of cul-
tural and religious difference that consociationalism has been discarded, be-
cause of its association with pillarization and the suffocating conformity into 
which the old pillars forced their members until the 1960s. We suggest that 
consociationalism can be reconstructed as a distinctively liberal approach that 
is more accommodating to the collective nature of identity, to the impor-
tance of a healthy pluralism in a democratic society, and to the inescapable 
public dimension of religious life. We want to highlight four distinctive ele-
ments of this tradition that are characteristic of the Dutch political and legal 
institutions.
First, inclusiveness. The system of proportional representation offers even 
tiny minorities the chance of a seat in parliament. The consensus culture 
and poldermodel imply that government should try to create broad support 
for policies, also by parties and groups that are not represented in the govern-
ment. The Netherlands does not have a winner-takes-all system, and although 
a winner- takes-all mentality is gaining ground, it is still not dominant in Dutch 
 political culture.
Second, evenhandedness. There is official recognition of confessional 
 parties and financial support for religion-based social organizations, such as 
confessional hospitals and welfare organizations. Most important, there is a 
constitutional guarantee for evenhanded support of private schools with 
71 Arend Lijphart, The Politics of Accommodation: Pluralism and Democracy in the Nether-
lands (1968); Arend Lijphart, “Self-determination versus pre-determination of ethnic mi-
norities in powersharing systems”, in W. Kymlicka (ed.), The Rights of Minority Cultures 
(1995); Arend Lijphart, “Constitutional design for divided societies”, 15(2) Journal of De-
mocracy (2004), 96.
72 Recent examples include two social agreements in 2019 on revising the Dutch pension 
system and on addressing the climate crisis. Both were preceded by long discussions and 
negotiations between representatives of many social organizations and political parties, 
and received support that was broader than that provided by the political parties that 
constitute the current coalition government.
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 religious and non-religious identities. This is all carried out proportionally, 
each group getting their fair share. It also expresses a belief in pluralist democ-
racy and in the importance of a flourishing and diverse civil society, as  opposed 
to the focus on individual citizens of classical liberalism, and to the emphasis 
on national conformity of republicanism and progressive nationalism.
Third, accommodation. The Netherlands used to be deeply divided on reli-
gion. These divisions could have easily destabilized the country and thrown it 
into turmoil. There is a deep wisdom in the way the Netherlands has histori-
cally managed to accommodate different religious and secular minorities by 
giving each their due. As a system for accommodating several entrenched and 
antagonistic communities it was extraordinarily successful. With the current 
secular majority, such mutual accommodation may not be a necessity any-
more, but it may still suggest solutions, especially with the rise of new, inward-
looking communities facilitated by 21st century communication networks. 
Where possible, religious minorities should be accommodated through special 
exemptions and other measures. Dutch law knew, and still knows, a wide range 
of exemptions to accommodate conscientious objections, from Mennonite ob-
jections against military service and the oath to orthodox-Calvinist objections 
against social security and vaccination.
Fourth, a pragmatic approach. Dutch consociationalism and the polder cul-
ture have never been the result of a theory of grand design, of Founding Fa-
thers with distinct political theories in mind. Lijphart formulated his theory of 
consociationalism only a few years before pillarization started to disintegrate 
in the Netherlands. It developed mainly in practice, nationally, but also at local 
levels, in a process of compromise and muddling through, adapting itself to 
changing circumstances throughout its history.
We believe that these principles are still very much alive in Dutch political 
and social culture. They are distinctly liberal, and may therefore provide a good 
starting point for rethinking liberal democracy. In our view, they can provide 
productive perspectives for dealing with the tensions and challenges discussed 
in this article. In light of the pragmatic approach, however, we believe the de-
velopment of “consociationalism 2.0” should not start from a theoretical 
 design, but rather go hand in hand with practical understanding of what does 
and does not work, especially at the local level. The hard work is not that of 
adapting theory but of adapting practice to changing circumstances.
